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Validation of Safety-Critical Systems for  
Aircraft Loss-of-Control Prevention and Recovery 
Christine M. Belcastro1 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, 23681 
Validation of technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery 
poses significant challenges.  Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, 
often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. 
Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under 
a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the validation framework must 
provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., 
that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks).  This paper summarizes a proposed 
validation framework for safety-critical systems, provides an overview of validation methods 
and tools developed by NASA to date within the Vehicle Systems Safety Project, and 
develops a preliminary set of test scenarios for the validation of technologies for LOC 
prevention and recovery. 
I. Introduction 
 
IRCRAFT loss of control (LOC) can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, 
which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. 1  Technologies developed for LOC prevention and 
recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions.  This requires the 
integration of technologies that can provide a comprehensive intervention strategy across a wide spectrum of LOC 
precursor conditions. 2-3 The Vehicle Systems Safety Technologies (VSST) Project within the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration’s (NASA) Aviation Safety Program (AvSP), is developing technologies that address 
aircraft LOC prevention and recovery.  This research falls within three technical challenges: 1.) Improve Crew 
Decision-Making under Complex Situations (CDM);  2.) Maintain Vehicle Safety between Major Inspections 
(MVS);  and 3.) Assure Safe and Effective Control under Hazardous Conditions (ASC).  Figure 1 provides an 
overview of VSST technologies related to LOC prevention and recovery. 
Research within VSST for addressing LOC focuses on the prevention and mitigation of inappropriate crew 
control inputs, vehicle impairment conditions and effects, and external disturbances.  LOC prevention and recovery 
is accomplished through research and technology development targeting each of these areas, as well as research and 
technology development to assess their flight safety implications and to provide anticipatory guidance to the crew 
and resilient flight systems. 
Inappropriate crew response is often a causal or contributing factor in LOC accidents.  Prevention of 
inappropriate crew actions is being addressed through the development of technologies for improved training, 
situation awareness, and flight deck countermeasures.  Improved training is being enabled through the development 
of enhanced vehicle dynamics models and simulations that more accurately characterize LOC precursor effects, and 
by supporting the establishment of training standards for retaining improved manual flying proficiency.  Improved 
situation awareness is being addressed  by ensuring that information is provided on the current aircraft state, 
including energy and attitude states as well as any vehicle impairment conditions and the associated implications.  
Flight deck countermeasures for preventing and mitigating the effects of spatial disorientation and crew distraction 
are also being developed.   
Vehicle impairment resulting from system and component failures or icing effects can also contribute to aircraft 
LOC.  Methods for failure prevention are being developed under MVS and are accomplished through improved 
component design and early detection of anomalies.  Real-time detection and mitigation of failures that do still 
occur, particularly those that directly impact vehicle dynamics and control characteristics, are being developed under 
ASC.  Icing effects detection, identification, and mitigation are also under development within ASC.  While the 
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detection of environmental hazards is not explicitly being addressed under VSST, methods for the mitigation of their 
effects are being considered under ASC, with a focus on wake vortex and turbulence encounters.  Multiple hazards 
effects from all of these categories are also being addressed under ASC, as well as methods for assessing their 
implications on flight safety.  Specific aspects of flight safety being addressed include identification of 
maneuverability constraints resulting from vehicle impairment conditions, detection of the onset of a vehicle upset 
condition (in the presence of other hazards, including inappropriate control inputs by the crew), and LOC prediction 
methods.  This information is provided to the crew as well as to the resilient vehicle systems. 
 
 
   Figure 1.  VSST technologies that focus on LOC prevention and recovery. 
 The validation of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery, such as those summarized in Fig. 1, 
poses significant challenges.  The term “validation” in this paper refers to the confirmation that the algorithms are 
performing their intended functions (i.e., LOC prevention and recovery), and an affirmation of their effectiveness in 
these functions.  The validation framework must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety 
technologies do no harm; i.e., that they themselves (individually and as an integrated system) do not introduce new 
safety risks.  This paper summarizes methods, software tools, and test capabilities developed to date or under 
development for the validation of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery. A preliminary set of 
LOC test scenarios for use in technology evaluations is also proposed.  Section II provides an overview of the 
validation framework under development, Section III provides a summary of advanced validation methods 
developed and applied to date, Section IV provides a discussion of validation requirements and presents a 
preliminary set of LOC test scenarios for use in technology validation, and Section V provides a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. Validation Framework for Integrated LOC Prevention & Recovery Technologies  
 
The VSST Project seeks to address cross-cutting aviation safety challenges that require integrated system 
effectiveness across technologies developed by the three technical challenges, as indicated in Fig. 1 for LOC 
prevention and recovery.  Future vehicle-related safety technologies must mitigate emerging risks related to 
increasing automation and system complexity, increasing traffic density, new vehicle designs and materials, new 
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operations, and greater fleet diversity.  Technologies developed under VSST must enable the safe implementation of 
new capabilities (e.g., NextGen) and assure favorable outcomes under hazardous conditions (e.g., LOC precursors).  
While accomplishing this, it must be ensured that new vehicle safety technologies do no harm; i.e., that they 
themselves do not introduce new safety risks.  Significant reduction of LOC as a key contributor to fatal aircraft 
accidents will require a coordinated effort across CDM, MVS, and ASC, and ultimately integrated system 
technologies that provide improved crew interfaces to support situation awareness and decision-making (CDM), 
real-time vehicle health management (MVS), and effective guidance and control under hazardous conditions (ASC).  
The safe realization of NextGen will also require vehicle capabilities that span each of the VSST TCs.   
Advanced evaluation methods are needed to accomplish effective validation of the technologies being developed 
for LOC prevention and recovery.  Current analytical methods and tools are based on linear system theory, and are 
therefore limited for analyses under highly nonlinear and off-nominal conditions.  For the analysis of LOC 
prevention and recovery technologies, analytical methods and tools are needed for evaluating nonlinear, adaptive, 
hybrid, diagnostic, prognostic, and other decision-based systems technologies — as well as integrated technologies 
that provide these capabilities.   Moreover, expanded operational envelopes and adverse conditions associated with 
aircraft LOC may render full Monte Carlo evaluations infeasible because of the very large operational space that 
must be considered.  Transport simulations have also traditionally been developed for normal flight conditions.  
Development of enhanced transport simulations that provide an accurate characterization of LOC conditions is 
essential for evaluation of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery.  Moreover, these enhanced 
simulation models must also be validated.  Experimental methods, ground-based and in-flight, for integrated 
technologies operating under high-risk conditions are also very limited. 
 In order to address this critical need, NASA has defined a comprehensive evaluation framework for validating 
integrated systems technologies developed for safe operation under hazardous conditions.4, 5 This framework uses a 
combination of analytical, simulation, and experimental methods to identify technology limitations, regions of safe 
and uncertain operation, and their boundaries.  Figure 2 graphically illustrates the key elements of this approach.  
Analytical methods are used to identify regions of potential problems relative to stability, performance, robustness, 
or coverage limitations.  Results from these methods can be used in guided Monte Carlo studies and piloted 
simulation evaluations.  Experimental test methods are used to investigate system properties and high-risk condition 
effects.  Real-time monitoring techniques can be used to enable testing under multiple hazards.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Key elements of an approach for validating safety-critical technologies developed for  
LOC prevention and recovery.  
 
An overview of the validation framework based on the approach of Fig. 2 is depicted in Fig. 3.  This figure 
provides a high-level view of a comprehensive evaluation framework defined for integrated systems involving 
technologies for maintaining vehicle safety, assuring safe and effective control under hazardous conditions, and 
supporting crew decision-making under complex situations.  In order to support the application of the framework of 
Fig. 3 for loss-of-control conditions, NASA is conducting research to improve analysis, simulation-based, and 
experimental methods under highly nonlinear flight conditions.  These methods are summarized in Section III.   
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Figure 3.  Overview of comprehensive framework for validating integrated safety-critical technologies  
developed for LOC prevention and recovery.  
 
III. Advanced Validation Methods for LOC Prevention and Recovery 
 
Advanced validation methods are the subject of ongoing NASA research for the comprehensive evaluation of 
future technologies.  One area of emphasis in this research is the development of methods for evaluating integrated 
system effectiveness for LOC prevention and recovery.  These methods, including ongoing work and future 
directions, are described in the following subsections. 
A. Advanced Analysis Methods 
 
Current validation methods used by industry center around linear stability, performance, and robustness analysis 
methods combined with Monte Carlo simulations.  The closed-loop system is analyzed at numerous trim conditions 
using linear methods, and nonlinear Monte Carlo simulations are used to provide confidence in system performance 
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analyses.   
The use of advanced linear and nonlinear analysis methods for flight control system validation has been the 
subject of significant research in Europe.7  NASA-sponsored research to date in advanced analysis methods has 
primarily focused on the development of methods and tools for analyzing the stability and robustness properties of 
nonlinear systems.  Vehicle upset conditions can involve highly nonlinear flight dynamics, so these methods and 
tools are needed to gain insight into nonlinear dynamics and control mechanisms that can lead to LOC, and for 
assessing the effectiveness of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery.  Analytical methods and 
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software tools have been developed for nonlinear region of attraction analysis,8 uncertainty quantification and 
stochastic robustness analysis of nonlinear systems,9 and nonlinear dynamics and control analysis.10   
The region of attraction for a nonlinear system provides an indication of the region of stability around an 
equilibrium point.  For a nonlinear closed-loop system, this can be thought of as a measure of local robustness about 
a trim condition.  Finding the exact region of attraction analytically may not be possible.11  However, recent methods 
have been developed for estimating regions of attraction using Sum-of-Squares (SOS) techniques (see Ref. 8), and 
they have been successfully used in analyzing closed-loop systems associated with the F/A-18 falling leaf mode.12  
Advanced linear robustness analysis methods were also applied to the F/A-18 falling leaf problem.13 
Assessing the risk of unlikely events (e.g., failures) is also an important problem.  Probabilistic  analysis 
methods were developed to bridge the gap between worst-case analysis and probabilistic measures of rare 
events.14,15,16,17  These methods were recently applied to an example flight control problem and the analysis results 
compared with worst-case and Monte Carlo analysis to emphasize the potential benefits of combining worst-case 
analysis with traditional probabilistic methods.18 
Uncertainty quantification and stochastic robustness analysis methods have also been developed for nonlinear 
systems involving uncertain parameters (see Ref. 9).  The associated analysis tool provides a methodology for 
evaluating the robustness of a control system relative to its ability to satisfy multiple design requirements.19 This 
methodology provides the ability to bound the region in the uncertain parameter space where the degradation in 
open-loop or closed-loop performance remains acceptable.  The uncertain parameters can be represented using 
deterministic or probabilistic models. The analysis framework allows high-order models and arbitrary control 
structures, with arbitrary functional dependencies between the requirements and the uncertain parameters.  The 
design requirements are specified as hard inequality constraints.  This analysis method has been applied to the 
determination of the safely recoverable flight envelope near stall. 20 This methodology has also recently been 
extended to a unifying framework that includes mixed aleatory and epistemic uncertainties represented in 
polynomial functional forms.21   
Nonlinear dynamics and control analysis methods and tools have also been the subject of NASA-sponsored 
research (see Ref. 10).  Among the tools available for analyzing nonlinear flight characteristics is that of bifurcation 
analysis using continuation methods.22  This tool allows efficient generation of one-parameter trim curves.  A related 
method using symbolic computing generates multi-parameter trim surfaces.23  These procedures can be 
supplemented to produce linear parameter varying (LPV) models that are useful for investigating controllability and 
observability properties, performing linear analysis over a nonlinear parameter space, as well as for designing gain 
scheduled linear regulators and parameter adaptive controllers.  These methods and tools have been applied to the 
analysis of transport aircraft under LOC conditions.24  Other significant methods and tools for nonlinear bifurcation 
analysis have been developed25 and applied to high-performance aircraft26–27 and to aircraft LOC problems.28   
Validation of diagnostic systems poses significant technical challenges, but has received less attention.  Initial 
work in this area focused on the application of generalized polynomial chaos (gPC) theory to model diagnostic 
system performance and on the development of a diagnostic validation framework to address the interactions 
between diagnostic systems and inner-loop control systems.29-30  This methodology has been applied to an example 
system that is representative of advanced diagnostic algorithms.31   
These analysis methods should be used in a coordinated manner with each other and with advanced simulation 
methods, as suggested by Fig. 3,  in order to identify potential regions in the operational space (including LOC 
precursor conditions) within which the closed-loop system is potentially inadequate relative to stability, 
performance, robustness, and/or coverage. 
B. Advanced Simulation Methods 
 
In order to conduct simulation evaluations of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery, the 
simulation must be capable of characterizing the vehicle dynamics and control effects of LOC precursor conditions, 
including vehicle upset conditions, vehicle impairment, and external disturbance effects.  This is not the current 
state-of-the-art in transport aircraft simulations, because the modeling of LOC precursor effects poses significant 
technical challenges.  In particular, these effects require multidisciplinary modeling methods, and they involve 
modeling of nonlinear and unsteady dynamics effects.  The development of advanced modeling and simulation 
methods for LOC characterization in transport aircraft has been the subject of significant research within NASA 
over the past 10–15 years.   
Significant advances have been made in vehicle upset modeling and simulation for transport aircraft.32  These 
advances address a critical need for improved stall training for commercial33,34 and military35 transport pilots.  
Continuing research in this area is underway to develop upset models that meet requirements for improved crew 
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training recommended by the International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE).36,37  
Moreover, representative upset modeling methods are being developed, including those under the VSST Project, for 
characterizing upset characteristics across classes of transport aircraft with similar geometric features and dynamical 
properties.  These representative modeling methods are vital to supporting improved training in a cost-effective and 
timely manner and are also needed for enhanced engineering simulations.  While the development of enhanced 
training simulations is a critical near-term need for improved pilot training, the development of enhanced 
engineering simulations for the development and evaluation of LOC prevention and recovery technologies is an 
equally important need and an even greater technical challenge.  Figure 4 provides a depiction of a proposed stall 
modeling envelope for crew training.  The red trace in Fig. 4 illustrates the excursions that can occur in extreme 
LOC accidents.  As indicated in the figure, these excursions in angles of attack and sideslip can go well beyond the 
improved training envelope.  While training is expected to significantly reduce LOC accidents, it is unlikely that 
training can eliminate all long-term causal factors, such as those due to structural damage or changes in operational 
conditions.  Moreover, training may not fully replicate the element of surprise and the panic that ensues under 
conditions such as these, nor can it fully predict (or prescribe) the human response under time-critical life-
threatening complex situations.  Onboard systems technologies that can provide LOC prevention and recovery under 
these extreme conditions are therefore also needed for effective LOC accident prevention (see Ref. 2 and 3).  For the 
development and evaluation of these technologies, enhanced engineering simulations are needed across the entire 
envelope illustrated in Fig. 4.  This therefore poses an even greater modeling and simulation challenge.   
Another area of significant modeling and simulation research and development is in characterizing vehicle 
impairment conditions resulting from vehicle damage and icing effects.  Vehicle damage can result as a collateral 
effect of system failures (e.g., uncontained engine failures38) and maintenance errors (e.g., insufficient lubrication of 
control surface fasteners39 and undetected fatigue cracks in the airframe structure40).  Vehicle damage can also result 
from design errors and/or inappropriate crew response.41  Recent and ongoing research in this area is being 
performed in collaboration with the United States Air Force, who also has a high interest in the safe flight of 
damaged transport aircraft.42  Recent and ongoing research into icing effects focuses on airframe icing43 as well as 
engine icing.44-45  The modeling and detection of airframe icing effects under turbulence conditions is also the 
subject of current research,46-47 as is the modeling and detection of engine icing effects.48 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.  Depiction of potential stall modeling envelope for pilot training.  
 
 
Simulation-based evaluation methods are also being used to evaluate the potential effectiveness of integrated 
flight and enhanced propulsion control capability for LOC prevention and recovery,49 as well as for determining the 
achievable dynamics of an impaired vehicle.50 
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C. Integrated and High-Risk Experimental Testing 
 
Integrated ground testing across VSST technologies for LOC prevention and recovery will be performed in the 
Systems and Airframe Failure Emulation, Testing, and Integration (SAFETI) Laboratory.  The SAFETI Lab is being 
developed to provide modular hardware-in-the-loop capability, including advanced programmable avionics systems, 
actuators, and sensors.  A linked-lab capability will enable the interconnection of laboratories within NASA 
Langley, NASA, or elsewhere.  The distributed multidisciplinary test capability of the SAFETI Lab will enable the 
closed-loop evaluation of error propagation and containment between integrated safety-critical subsystems, 
including the effects of missed detections, incorrect decisions, and inappropriate control actions.  Reference 4 has a 
more detailed description of the SAFETI Lab. 
In-flight testing under LOC precursor conditions is essential for the evaluation of vehicle dynamics models as 
well as onboard system technologies.  Full-scale testing is essential for evaluating flight deck technologies.  
However, full-scale aircraft cannot be flown into high-risk LOC precursor conditions.  To address this critical need, 
the Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) Testbed was developed.51  Figure 5 shows the 
various components of the AirSTAR Testbed.  This test capability consists of flying subscale aircraft (some 
dynamically scaled transport aircraft), as well as ground facilities for laboratory pre-flight testing and deployments.  
The mobile operations station (MOS) supports deployments and provides a pilot station from which the research 
pilot executes research flight test plans. The MOS also has stations for researchers and test engineers.  To date, 58 
research flights have been conducted on the remotely piloted generic transport model (GTM) T2 aircraft, a 5.5% 
dynamically scaled conventional (i.e., conventional tail with twin wing-mounted engines) transport flying model.  
Within these 58 research flights, 4 vehicle dynamics LOC modeling studies were performed, and 10 advanced 
control laws evaluated under a high-workload offset landing task with destabilized dynamics in pitch and roll as well 
as degraded control capability (i.e., 50% loss of elevator effectiveness).  This research was accomplished within 
visual range of a safety pilot using a hand-held remote control for takeoff and landing (and for taking control from 
the research pilot in the event of a transmission failure in the MOS).  Future directions will involve testing of T-tail 
aircraft under beyond visual range (BVR) operations.  BVR capability will permit flying at altitudes above 1500 ft 
over the test range.  The extension to BVR operations is needed for extending the achievable flight envelope  for 
conventional and T-tail aircraft testing, as illustrated in Figure 6.  As indicated in the figure, flight beyond stall angle 
of attack would not be achievable for a T-tail aircraft model under current visual operations.  This is due to the 
anticipated departure characteristics of T-tail aircraft, which includes the potential for unstable pitch characteristics 
(see Ref. 37).  Moreover, BVR operations significantly extend the flight envelope for both conventional and T-tail 
aircraft.  A more detailed description of AirSTAR accomplishments and future BVR operations is provided in Ref. 
52.    
 
 
 
Figure 5.  AirSTAR testbed  
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Figure 6.  Illustration of achievable AirSTAR test envelope under BVR operations.  
 
 
D. Real-Time Monitoring 
 
NASA has recently developed several onboard methods for monitoring system behavior.  A run-time stability 
margin estimation method and tool have been developed for monitoring control law stability margins online in 
quasi-real-time, and a preliminary evaluation of this method was performed using the AirSTAR Testbed.53  Future 
directions will include real-time monitoring of new metrics being developed to characterize flight safety and for 
predicting LOC.     
 
IV. Technology Validation for LOC Prevention and Recovery Effectiveness 
 
Validation of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery will require extensive testing and 
evaluation to ensure technology effectiveness, to identify limitations, and to assess LOC coverage.  The following 
subsections address the validation of modeling and simulation and onboard systems technologies. 
A. Validation of Modeling and Simulation Technologies  
 
Accurate models and simulations that can effectively characterize LOC conditions are critical to the 
establishment of improved training and for the development and evaluation of onboard systems for LOC prevention 
and recovery.  Validation of enhanced models and simulations for LOC characterization is a significant challenge 
requiring the use of flight test data, accident data, and experimental test data.  Figure 7 illustrates this approach for 
validating upset models.   
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Figure 7.  Validation approach for modeling and simulation technologies for upset characterization.  
 
 
 
While flight test data and accident data are essential for vehicle dynamics model validation, they may not be 
sufficient for post-stall modeling envelopes needed for the validation of onboard systems technologies.  Under the 
VSST Project, experimental test data from the AirSTAR Testbed will be used to supplement full-scale flight data 
and accident data.  The validity of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) data will be established using wind tunnel 
and subscale flight test data.  Icing effects data will be obtained via wind tunnel tests and CFD methods and 
evaluated against accident data where available.  Failure and failure effects data (and damage effects) will be 
obtained via wind tunnel testing and CFD and substantiated using accident and subscale flight testing. 
B. Validation of Onboard Systems Technologies 
 
Onboard system technologies must be comprehensively evaluated using analysis, simulation, and experimental 
test methods, as described in Sections II and III.  The simulations used in the evaluations should be validated relative 
to characterization of LOC conditions, as discussed in Section IV.A.  Moreover, the onboard system technologies 
depicted in Fig. 1 must be evaluated individually and as integrated systems for their LOC prevention and recovery 
effectiveness, limitations in LOC coverage, and subsystem error propagation effects.  Figure 3 outlines a framework 
for doing this.  In order to accomplish a thorough evaluation of technology effectiveness for LOC prevention and 
recovery, and the associated coverage of LOC precursor conditions that relates to current and future risks, a set of 
LOC test scenarios is needed. 
The LOC analysis of Ref. 1 identified 52 unique LOC sequences, based on temporal ordering of causal and 
contributing factors, that were associated with the 30-year accident data set used in the analysis.  These sequences 
were combined and generalized in order to obtain a smaller, more actionable set.   A set of seven generalized LOC 
sequences was defined, which are representative of 88.9% of the accidents and 90.8% of the fatalities considered in 
Ref. 1.  These LOC sequences, as well as the underlying accident set and identified future potential hazards, can be 
used to generate LOC test scenarios that are representative of the LOC problem being addressed, including the near-
term LOC problem focus identified in Ref. 3 for the VSST Project, which is repeated below in Figure 8.  LOC 
coverage can be determined based on the historical data and future risks used in developing the test scenarios.   
 
Upset 
Prevention /
Recovery
Systems
Envelope
Stall
Modeling
Envelope 
For 
Improved 
Training
Full‐scale flight test data
AirSTARFlight Test Envelope
Subscale  flying 
models
Flight Test
Stall
Accident data
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
10
 
Figure 8.  VSST Project near-term LOC problem focus. 
 
To develop a preliminary set of LOC test scenarios, 20 LOC hazards in four precursor categories and 10 future 
risks were defined. Table 1 summarizes the LOC hazards by precursor category, including adverse vehicle 
conditions, inappropriate crew response, external hazards and disturbances, and vehicle upset conditions.  It should 
be noted that for the purpose of defining test scenarios, the first two categories (adverse vehicle conditions and 
inappropriate crew response) were split from the category “adverse onboard conditions” of Ref. 1.  Future potential 
risks are defined in Table 2 based on current and future trends.  This list adds several trends and risks relative to 
those considered in Ref. 1.  Table 3 summarizes the accidents covered by the generalized sequences of Ref. 1.  The 
bracketed accident sets in Table 3 correspond to each unique sequence identified in Ref. 1 for the accident set 
considered.   
A preliminary set of 60 LOC test scenarios was developed (see Appendix A) based on the accident set of Ref. 1 
and the initial set of potential future LOC risks defined in Table 2.  This preliminary set contains scenarios involving 
from one to four LOC precursors from the hazards categories of Table 1.  The recommended methods of evaluation 
for each scenario are also provided.  The scenario set of Appendix A can be reduced to the LOC problem focus 
defined in Fig. 8 by deleting scenarios involving precursors that are not contained in the near-term focus set (e.g., 
those involving damage and wind shear).  Coverage of the accident and future risk sets by these scenarios is 
provided in Appendix B.  Each LOC test scenario is related to the generalized sequence and associated accidents 
defined in Tables 1 and 3 from Ref. 1, and the future risks identified in Table 2.  As indicated in Appendix B, 115 
accidents of the 126 accident set (or 91.3%) are covered by the LOC scenario set, and 9 of the 10 future risks are 
covered (or 90%).  Future risk 2 was not explicitly covered by the scenarios but would be associated with any 
scenario involving upset if evaluated for a future vehicle configuration.  An example of this would be the evaluation 
of a blended wing-body configuration’s upset characteristics for which little is currently known.  A cumulative count 
of accidents and future risks coverage is also provided in Appendix B in order to account for coverage of a subset of 
scenarios.   
The LOC test scenarios provided in Appendix A are preliminary in that they are based on a preliminary set of 
accidents from Ref. 1 and potential future risks defined in Table 2.  It is recommended that a sanctioned set of 
accidents and future risks be defined and an associated set of LOC test scenarios be developed in collaboration with 
a LOC Working Group (see Section II. B. of Ref. 3) in order to consider a full set of agreed upon hazards.  Incidents 
may also be considered in this development.  The resulting LOC scenarios can be used when evaluating the 
guidance, control, and systems (GCS) technologies defined in Ref. 3, as well as the integrated capabilities depicted 
in Fig. 1, using the comprehensive validation framework depicted in Fig. 3 and described more fully in Ref. 4.   
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Table 1. LOC Hazards list by precursor category. 
Adverse Vehicle Conditions 
1 Vehicle Impairment (Includes Inappropriate Configuration, Contaminated Airfoil, Improper Loading, etc.) 
2 System Faults, Failures, and Errors (Includes Design Flaws, Software Errors, Improper Maintenance Actions, etc.) 
3 
Vehicle Damage (Includes Airframe / Engine Damage Resulting 
from Fatigue Cracks, Foreign Objects, Overstress During Upset / 
Recovery, etc.) 
Inappropriate Crew Response 
1 Pilot-Induced Oscillation (PIO) 
2 Spatial Disorientation (SD) 
3 Poor Energy Management 
4 Mode Confusion / Mismanagement of Automation 
5 Ineffective Recovery 
6 Crew Fatigue/Impairment 
7 Failure to Take Appropriate Actions 
External Hazards and Disturbances 
1 Poor Visibility 
2 Wake Vortices 
3 Wind Shear, Gusts, Thunderstorms 
4 Snow, Icing 
5 Abrupt Maneuvers for Collision Avoidance 
Vehicle Upset Conditions 
1 Abnormal Attitude 
2 Abnormal Airspeed, Angular Rates, Asymmetric Forces 
3 Abnormal Flight Trajectory 
4 Uncontrolled Descent (Includes Spiral Dive, etc.) 
5 Stall / Departure from Controlled Flight 
 
 
 
Table 2. Potential future LOC risks list by trend. 
No. Trend / Condition Potential LOC Risk Factors 
1 Increased Automation without Improved Crew Interfaces Increase in Inappropriate Crew Response
2 Future Vehicle Configurations without Identification of Upset Characteristics Increased Incidents of Vehicle Upsets 
3 Increased System Complexity without Comprehensive Evaluation Process Increase in System Faults / Failures / Errors / Insufficiencies
4 High‐Density Operations in Terminal Area Increase in Wake Vortex Encounters
5 High‐Density Operations in Terminal Area Increase in Pilot Workload
6 Increase in Flight Deck Automation Decrease in Manual Piloting Skills
7 All‐Weather Operations Increase in Snow/Icing Encounters
8 All‐Weather Operations in Terminal Area Increase in Wind Shear / Turbulence Encounters
9 High‐Density Mixed‐Vehicle Operations Increased Incidence of Near‐Miss and Mid‐Air Collision Events 
10 New Vehicle Materials with Lack of Long‐Term Data on Aging and Damage Tolerance Increase in Damage‐Initiated LOC Events 
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Table 3. Accidents summary (Ref. 1) 
Generalized 
Sequence  Number of Accidents 
Number of 
Fatalities
Number of LOC 
Precursors in 
Sequence
Unique 
Sequences Accidents from Data Set 
A 43 1855 2 or 3 
1, 5, 17, 18, 29, 
31, 34, 43, 45, 
47 
[14], [11, 19, 31, 33, 37, 42, 43, 49, 51, 
61, 65, 76, 83, 100, 106], [104, 120], 
[118], [70], [85], [95, 107], [67], [126], 
[91]
B 20 907 3 or 4 26, 36, 46, 9, 20, 39, 41 
[12, 53, 59, 60], [21, 27], [94], [5, 47, 
77, 81, 82], [117], [22, 86, 102], [34, 
45, 46, 48] 
C 17 1095 2 or 3 21, 22, 23, 24 [39, 64, 78, 87, 89, 93, 108, 115, 116], [30, 75, 88, 109, 114], [52], [96, 105]
D 16 484 1 4, 6, 16, 3, 32 [1, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 41, 56, 62, 63, 79], [2, 110], [3], [7], [16] 
E 8 569 2 30, 33, 35, 40, 45, 48, 49 
[57, 92], [23, 122], [26], [28, 35, 36, 
38, 50, 55, 68, 69, 73, 84, 97, 101, 111, 
123], [32, 66], [98], [8, 24, 113]
F 7 569 2, 3, or 4  13, 14, 15, 27, 37, 38 [4], [58], [54], [103], [80], [71, 99]
G 1 50 3 42 [6] 
 
 
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has provided a summary of the validation technologies developed to date within the VSST Project of 
the NASA AvSP for the evaluation of LOC prevention and recovery technologies.  Specifically, analytical, 
simulation, experimental testing, and real-time monitoring technologies were summarized and key references 
provided on the status of their development and application to LOC example problems.  Analytical methods and 
tools have been developed for analyzing the stability, robustness, and dynamics and control characteristics of 
nonlinear systems.  These methods have individually been applied to LOC example problems.  Enhanced vehicle 
dynamics modeling methods have been developed for characterizing LOC hazards effects in simulation.  These 
enhanced simulations will be used for improved pilot training and for the development and evaluation of onboard 
systems technologies for LOC prevention and recovery.  The validation of vehicle dynamics models developed for 
LOC characterization was discussed in the context of enhanced training and engineering simulations.  A proposed 
stall modeling envelope for crew training was presented and related to a broader envelope that is needed for onboard 
systems technologies development and evaluation.  The onboard systems technologies being developed under VSST 
for LOC prevention and recovery were summarized.  The validation of these technologies was discussed and a 
proposed validation framework reviewed for the resulting integrated systems.  Validation of these systems will 
require extensive evaluation under realistic LOC scenarios.  A preliminary set of LOC test scenarios was developed 
based on the accident set of Ref. 1 and future potential risks.  Coverage by the test scenarios of the accidents and 
future risks was evaluated, and it was determined that the preliminary LOC test scenarios cover 91.3% of the 
accidents and 90% of the future risks considered in this paper.  Development of an endorsed set of LOC test 
scenarios based on a more complete set of accidents and future potential risks will be the subject of future work.  
This will be accomplished in collaboration with a LOC Working Group that is being established or with other 
researchers.  Such a set of test scenarios will be used in the evaluation of the GCS and LOC technologies that are 
currently under development within the VSST Project.    
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Appendix A:  LOC Test Scenarios 
 
    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
Single Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Vehicle Failure, Damage 
1 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Flight Control 
Component Failure 
(Control Surface 
Actuator) 
Takeoff 
(Repeat for 
Approach, 
Cruise) 
Jammed Surface Actuator 
(Varying Positions from 
Neutral to Hard-over) 
  
2 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Flight Control 
Component Failure 
(Control Surface 
Actuator) 
Takeoff 
(Repeat for 
Approach, 
Cruise) 
Loss of Control 
Effectiveness (25%, 50%, 
75%, 100%) 
  
3 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Flight Control 
Component Failure 
(Engine) 
Takeoff 
(Repeat for 
Approach, 
Cruise) 
Single Engine Failure 
(25%, 50%, 75%, 100% 
Thrust Reduction) 
  
4 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Flight Control 
Component Failure 
(Engine) 
Takeoff 
(Repeat for 
Approach, 
Cruise) 
Double Engine Failure 
(25%, 50%, 75%, 100% 
Thrust Reduction) 
  
5 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Flight Control 
Component Failure 
(Actuator) 
Landing 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Cruise) 
Control Effector Reversal   
6 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Vehicle Impairment 
Resulting from 
Overweight / 
Improper Loading 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Approach) 
Variations in Weight & C.G. 
location   
7 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes Resulting 
from Damage 
Conditions 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Approach) 
Fuselage Damage   
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
8 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Uncontained Engine 
Failure Resulting in 
Vehicle Damage 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Approach) 
Structural Damage (Lifting 
Surface, Control Surface, 
Fuselage); Single Engine 
Thrust Set to 0 
  
9 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Uncontained Engine 
Failure Resulting in 
Vehicle Damage 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Approach) 
Structural Damage (Lifting 
Surface, Control Surface, 
Fuselage); Single Engine 
Thrust Set to 0,  Loss of 
Control Effectors due to 
Cut Hydraulics Lines (Vary-
ing Levels of Loss from 1 to 
All), Collateral Damage to 
Underlying Systems 
     
10 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes Resulting 
from Icing 
Conditions 
Approach, 
Cruise, 
Takeoff 
Varying Levels of Vehicle 
Dynamics Changes under 
Ice Accretion (from Mild 
Through Destabilizing), 
Varying Degrees of Control 
Effectiveness Loss (Control 
Surfaces, Engines, Both) 
     
Single Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard 
11 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wind Shear / 
Turbulence 
Approach 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff) 
    
Various Wind Shear Profiles 
(from Mild to Severe), Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy) 
  
12 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wake Vortex 
Encounter 
Approach 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff) 
    
Varying Wake Profiles, 
Intensities, and Incidence 
Angles 
  
Two Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Crew Error –> Upset 
13 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Inadvertent Control 
Input by Crew 
followed by 
Abnormal Attitude 
Upset 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Approach) 
  
1.  Inadvertent Pitch Down 
Command (Repeat for Roll, 
Yaw) 
  2.  Undesired Change in Pitch (Roll, Yaw) 
14 Piloted Simulation 
Inadvertent Autopilot 
Disengage  by Crew 
Leading to Stall/Spin 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff, 
Approach) 
  
1.  Inadvertent Disengage 
Control of Ailerons (Repeat for 
Elevator, Rudder, Throttle) 
  2.  Stall / Spin 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
15 Piloted Simulation 
Inappropriate 
Control inputs on 
Go-around Leading 
to Stall 
Approach   
1.  Poor Energy Management 
on Go-around (Continued Aft 
Column with Reducing 
Airspeed) 
  2.  Pitch Up, Decreased Airspeed 
16 Piloted Simulation 
Failure to Recover 
from Stall due to 
Distraction 
Approach, 
Takeoff   
1.  Distraction (Traffic Pattern, 
Fatigue) Resulting in No 
Response or Delayed / 
Ineffective Response 
  2.  Stall  
17 Piloted Simulation 
Upset Resulting from 
Inappropriate 
Piloting Technique 
on Final Approach 
Approach 
(Repeat for 
Takeoff) 
  
1.  Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique on Approach / 
Takeoff, Ineffective Recovery 
  2.  Various Upset Conditions 
Two Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Vehicle Problem –> Upset  
18 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Failure in Inertial 
Reference Unit 
Leading to Vehicle 
Upset (Abnormal 
Attitude / Stall / 
Uncontrolled 
Descent) 
Cruise 
(Repeat for 
Approach, 
Takeoff) 
1.  Error in Attitude (Pitch, 
Roll, Yaw) Measurement     
2.  Undesired Pitch, Roll, Yaw 
from Autopilot (or Commanded 
by Crew) 
19 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Incorrect Flap 
Setting on Takeoff 
Leading to Stall 
Takeoff 
(Repeat for 
Approach) 
1.  Various Flap Settings 
(from 0 to less than full)     2.  Stall 
20 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Unresponsive 
Engines Leading to 
Lowspeed Stall / 
Uncontrolled 
Descent 
Approach 
(Repeat for 
Cruise, 
Takeoff) 
1.  Engines Unresponsive 
to Throttle Commands by 
Crew / System 
    2.  Low Speed Stall, Uncontrolled Descent 
21 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Uncommanded 
Bank (Repeat for 
Pitch, Yaw) Leading 
to Extreme Attitude 
Upset 
Cruise 
(Repeat on 
Approach 
Using 
Autoland) 
1.  Autopilot / Autoland 
Failure: Erroneous Roll 
Command Varying for 10, 
20, 40, 60 Degrees 
(Repeat for Pitch, Yaw) 
    2.  Abnormal Roll, Pitch, Yaw 
22 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Control Surface 
Failure Leading to 
Uncommanded 
Attitude / Stall–Spin 
Upset 
Approach 
(Repeat for 
Cruise, 
Takeoff) 
1.  Horizontal Stabilizer / 
Elevator Failure (Loss, 
Reversal)  (Repeat for 
Ailerons, Vertical Stabilizer 
/ Rudder); Control Surface 
Asymmetry (Inability to 
Retract Flaps/Slats on One 
Side) and Surface Loss 
    
2.  Uncommanded Attitude, 
Asymmetric forces, Stall / Spin, 
Varying Degrees of Instability in 
Longitudinal / Lateral-directional  
axes 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
23 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Engine Failure 
Leading to 
Asymmetric 
Force/Acceleration 
Upsets 
Approach 
(Repeat for 
Cruise, 
Takeoff) 
1.  Single Engine Failures 
Leading to Asymmetry     2.  Asymmetric Force Upset 
24 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Uncommanded 
Airspeed Reduction 
Leading to Stall 
Takeoff 
(Repeat for 
Cruise, 
Approach) 
1.  Uncommanded 
Reduction in Engine Power     2.  Stall 
25 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Icing Impairment 
Leading to Abnormal 
Attitudes & Stall 
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Varying Degrees of 
Vehicle Dynamics Changes 
(Lifting & Control Surface 
Impairments–Including 
Loss of Controllability & 
Hinge Moment Reversal), 
Varying Degrees of Engine 
Icing Effects from None to 
Thrust Roll-back 
    2.  Abnormal Roll, Pitch, Yaw; Stall 
Two Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Upset 
26 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wake Encounter 
Leading to Abnormal 
Attitude Upset 
Approach, 
Takeoff     
1.  Varying Wake Profiles, 
Intensities, and Incidence 
Angles 
2.  Abnormal Roll, Pitch, Yaw; 
Abnormal Angular Rates 
27 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wind Shear / 
Turbulence Leading 
to Abnormal 
Trajectory / Stall 
Approach, 
Takeoff     
1.  Various Wind Shear Profiles 
(from Mild to Severe), Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy) 
2.  Abnormal Trajectory, Stall 
Two Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Vehicle Hazard 
28 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Mid-Air Encounter 
with Another Aircraft 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Damage 
Cruise, 
Approach, 
Takeoff 
2.  Various Levels of 
Structural Damage (Lifting 
Surface, Control Surface, 
Fuselage) from Moderate 
to Destabilizing 
  
1.  Another Vehicle Suddenly 
Appears within Range of 
Aircraft Requiring a Sudden 
Avoidance Maneuver 
  
Two Precursor LOC Scenarios: Vehicle Hazard –> External Hazard  
29 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Sensor Failure 
Followed by Various 
External Hazards 
(Poor Visibility, 
Wake, Wind Shear, 
Turbulence) 
Cruise, 
Approach, 
Takeoff 
1.  Single / Multiple 
Failure(s) in Measurement 
System (Altitude, Airspeed, 
Attitude)  
  
2.  Various Wake Levels and 
Impingement Angles;  Various 
Wind Shear Profiles; Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy); Day and Night 
Conditions 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
30 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Engine Failure 
Followed by Various 
External Hazards 
(Poor Visibility, 
Wake, Wind Shear, 
Turbulence) 
Cruise, 
Approach, 
Takeoff 
1.  Single/Double Engine 
Failure (25%, 50%, 75%, 
100% Thrust Reduction) 
  
2.  Various Wake Levels and 
Impingement Angles;  Various 
Wind Shear Profiles; Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy); Day and Night 
Conditions 
  
31 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Control Surface 
Failure Followed by 
External Hazard 
(Poor Visibility, 
Wake, Wind Shear, 
Turbulence) 
Cruise, 
Approach, 
Takeoff 
1.  Varying Control Surface 
Failures involving Single / 
Multiple Surfaces 
(Jammed, Loss of 
Effectiveness, Reversal) 
  
2.  Various Wake Levels and 
Impingement Angles;  Various 
Wind Shear Profiles; Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy); Day and Night 
Conditions 
  
32 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Single Engine & 
Control Surface 
Failures Followed by 
External Hazard 
Cruise, 
Approach, 
Takeoff 
1.  Single Engine Failure 
(100% Thrust Reduction), 
Varying Control Surface 
Failure (Jammed, Loss of 
Effectiveness, Reversal) 
Consistent with 
Uncontained Engine 
Failure, Underlying 
Instrumentation Failure 
Consistent with 
Uncontained Engine 
Failure, Various levels of 
Structural Damage (Lifting 
Surface, Control Surface, 
Fuselage) from None to 
Destabilizing 
  
2.  Various Wake Levels and 
Impingement Angles;  Various 
Wind Shear Profiles; Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy); Day and Night 
Conditions 
  
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Vehicle Problem –> Inappropriate Crew Response –> Vehicle Upset 
33 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Failure in 
Measurement 
System Followed by 
Failure by Control 
System and Crew to 
Maintain Velocity 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Stall 
Approach, 
Cruise 
(e.g., 
During 
Climb / 
Descent), 
Takeoff 
1.  Failure in Measurement 
System (Altitude, Airspeed, 
Attitude) while Autothrottle 
and/or Autopilot are 
Engaged 
2.  Crew is Distracted with a 
Faulty Flight Deck System 
(Cruise) or an Intense 
Nextgen Operational Task 
(Approach, Takeoff), and 
Assumes Autoflight Systems 
are Working Properly; Pilot 
Fails to Recover  
(Pilot Provides:    
  a.  Ineffective           
  b.  Delayed   
  c.  Exacerbating Recovery 
Commands)  
  3.  Aircraft Enters a Low Speed Stall  
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
34 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Single Engine 
Failure / Malfunction 
Followed by Failure 
of Crew to Respond 
Leading to Vehicle 
Upset (Asymmetry, 
Abnormal Angular 
Rates, Stall) 
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Single Engine Failure 
(Unresponsive to Throttle 
Commands) 
2.  Crew is Incapacitated 
(Cruise) or Distracted with 
High-intensity NextGen 
Workload (Takeoff / 
Approach); Pilot Fails to 
Recover (Pilot Provides:    
a. Ineffective          
b. Delayed 
c. Exacerbating Recovery 
Commands)  
  3.  Abnormal Angular Rates, Thrust Asymmetry, Stall 
35 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Control Surface 
Failure / Malfunction 
Followed by Failure 
of Crew to Respond 
Leading to Vehicle 
Upset (Asymmetry, 
Abnormal Angular 
Rates, Instability, 
Stall/Departure) 
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Varying Control Surface 
Failure Involving Single 
Surface (Jammed, Loss of 
Effectiveness, Reversal) 
2.  Pilot Fails to Respond 
Appropriately (Pilot Provides 
Control Commands in Varying 
Degrees of Responsiveness: 
a. None 
b. Delayed 
c. Ineffective 
d. Exacerbating) 
  
3.  Abnormal Angular Rates, 
Force Asymmetries, Instabilities, 
Departure from Controlled Flight 
36 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Vehicle Suffers 
Airframe Structural 
Damage, Pilot 
Doesn't Respond 
Properly to Change 
in Dynamics, Vehicle 
Enters Upset   
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Airframe Damage at 
Varying Levels of Severity 
Resulting in Changes to 
Vehicle Dynamics 
(Includes Stable, Neutrally 
Stable, Unstable 
Dynamics);  Scenarios with 
and without Single Engine 
Failures;  Scenarios with 
and without Control 
Surface Loss of 
Effectiveness 
2. Pilot Fails to Respond 
Appropriately (Pilot Provides 
Control Commands in Varying 
Degrees of Responsiveness:      
a. None,                         
b. Delayed,    
c. Ineffective,                          
d. Exacerbating) 
 
  
3.  Abnormal Angular Rates, 
Force Asymmetries, Instabilities, 
Departure from Controlled Flight 
37 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by Loss of Energy 
State Awareness 
and Inappropriate 
Crew Response 
Leading to Vehicle 
Stall 
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes under Airframe 
Ice Accretion, Varying 
Degrees of Engine Icing 
Effects from None to Thrust 
Roll-back  
2.  Crew is Unaware of Low 
Energy State, and Fails to 
Recover from Stall (Pilot 
Provides Control Commands 
in Varying Degrees of 
Responsiveness: 
a. None 
b. Delayed 
c. Ineffective 
d. Exacerbating) 
  
3.  Slow Degradation in 
Airspeed, Slow Loss of Altitude, 
Stall (Low Energy) 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
38 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by Inappropriate 
Crew Response 
(Incapacitation) 
Leading to Stall 
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes under Airframe 
Ice Accretion, Varying 
Degrees of Engine Icing 
Effects from None to Thrust 
Roll-back  
2.  Crew Fatigue / Impairment 
Resulting in:     
a. No Response 
b. Delayed Response 
c. Exacerbating Response 
  3.  Stall / Departure 
39 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by Inappropriate 
Crew Control Input 
Leading to 
Oscillatory Vehicle 
Response 
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
1.  Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes under Airframe 
Ice Accretion with Varying 
Degrees of Destabilized 
Vehicle Response in Roll, 
Pitch, Yaw, Varying 
Degrees of Engine Icing 
Effects from None to Thrust 
Roll-back  
2.  Crew Provides Ineffective 
Recovery, PIO Induced in 
a. Roll 
b. Pitch 
c. Yaw     
  3.  Oscillatory Response in Roll, Pitch, Yaw 
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Inappropriate Crew Response –> Vehicle Upset 
40 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Poor Visibility 
Leading to Pilot 
Spatial 
Disorientation and 
Stall / Spiral Dive  
Takeoff, 
Approach 
(with and 
without Go-
Around), 
Cruise 
  
2.  Spatial Disorientation:  Pilot 
is Inactive (Repeat with 
Exacerbating Control Inputs) 
1.  Piloted Simulation: Night 
(Repeat with Fog/Clouds) 
3.  Right/Left Roll to Spiral Dive 
(Varying Pitch Angles and 
Vehicle Velocities);  Stall / 
Departure 
41 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Poor Visibility 
Leading to Pilot 
Spatial 
Disorientation and 
Stall / Spiral Dive  
Takeoff, 
Approach, 
Cruise 
  
2.  Spatial Disorientation:  Pilot 
is Inactive (Repeat with 
Exacerbating Control Inputs) 
1.  Piloted Simulation: Night 
(Repeat with Fog/Clouds), 
Turbulence, Thunderstorms 
3.  Right/Left Roll to Spiral Dive 
(Varying Pitch Angles and 
Vehicle Velocities);  Stall / 
Departure 
42 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wind Shear 
Followed by 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response and 
Vehicle Upset 
(Sudden Drop in 
Ground Speed and 
Rapid Descent) 
Takeoff, 
Approach   
2.  Crew Responds 
Inappropriately: 
a. Delayed Reaction 
b. Incorrect Recovery 
c. Exacerbating Inputs 
1.  Various Wind Shear Profiles;  
Varying Levels of Turbulence 
(Light, Medium, Heavy) 
3.  Airspeed / Ground Speed 
Excursions, Sudden Drop in 
Ground Speed, Stall, Rapid 
Descent 
43 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wind Shear 
Encounter Followed 
by PIO Leading to 
Vehicle Upset 
Approach 
(with and 
without Go-
Around), 
Takeoff 
 
  
2.  PIO Induced  
a. Roll 
b. Pitch 
c. Yaw     
1.  Various Wind Shear Profiles 
(from None to Severe), Severe 
Wind Gusts (Longitudinal, 
Lateral, Angled) 
3.  Oscillations in Roll, Pitch, 
Yaw 
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Vehicle Problem –> Upset 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Vehicle Problem –> Upset 
44 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by Failure of 
Airspeed Sensor 
(Blocked Pilot Tube) 
Leading to Vehicle 
Stall 
Approach, 
Takeoff, 
Cruise 
1.  Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes under Airframe 
Ice Accretion, Varying 
Degrees of Engine Icing 
Effects from None to Thrust 
Roll-back;                               
2.  Erratic Airspeed 
Measurements 
  
1.  Simulator:  Day and Night, 
with and without Fog / Clouds, 
Icing Conditions with and 
without Snow 
3.  Stall, Various Levels of 
Destabilizing Effects from None 
to Unstable in 
a. One 
b. Two 
c. Three Axes  
45 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation, 
Subscale Flight 
Testing 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by Control Surface 
Failure Leading to 
Vehicle Stall 
Approach, 
Takeoff, 
Cruise 
1.  Vehicle Dynamics 
Changes under Airframe 
Ice Accretion, Varying 
Degrees of Engine Icing 
Effects from None to Thrust 
Roll-back;                               
2.  Horizontal Stabilizer / 
Elevator Failure (Loss, 
Reversal)  (Repeat for 
Ailerons, Vertical Stabilizer 
/ Rudder); Control Surface 
Asymmetry (Inability to 
Retract Flaps/Slats on One 
Side) and Surface Loss 
  
1.  Simulator:  Day and Night, 
With and Without Fog / Clouds, 
Icing Conditions with and 
without Snow 
3.  Asymmetric Forces, Stall, 
Various Levels of Destabilizing 
Effects from None to Unstable in 
a. One 
b. Two 
c. Three Axes 
46 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by All Engine Flame-
Out Leading to 
Vehicle Stall 
Cruise 
1.  Various Degrees of 
Vehicle Dynamics Changes 
under Airframe Ice 
Accretion (from None to 
Destabilizing);                        
2.  Engine Flame-out 
Effects on All Engines 
(Thrust Set to Zero) 
  
1.  Simulator:  Day and Night, 
With and Without Fog / Clouds, 
Icing Conditions with and 
without Snow 
3.  Decreasing Airspeed, Stall, 
Various Levels of Destabilizing 
Effects from None to Unstable in 
a. One 
b. Two 
c. Three Axes   
47 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wind Shear 
Encounter Followed 
by Control System 
Failure Leading to 
Stall 
Approach 
(with and 
without Go-
Around), 
Takeoff 
2.  Failure in 
a. Autopilot 
b. Autothrottle 
c. Control Surface 
Actuators (Jammed, 
Reversal);   
Scenarios with and without 
Single Engine Failures   
  
1.  Simulator:  Day and Night, 
With and Without Fog / Clouds, 
Various Wind Shear Profiles 
(with and without Rain  / 
Thunderstorm Activity), Varying 
Levels of Turbulence (Light, 
Medium, Heavy) 
3.  Attitude Excursions 
a. Roll 
b. Pitch 
c. Yaw; 
Airspeed Variations: 
a. Decreasing 
b. Increasing; 
Asymmetric Forces under 
Jammed Surface Failures; Stall 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
21
    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
48 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Extreme Turbulence 
Followed by 
Temporary Onboard 
Power Outage 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Upset 
Cruise 
2.  Temporary Power 
Outage with Loss of Power 
to 
a. Flight 
b. Navigation 
c. Engine 
d. All Instruments 
  
1.  Simulator:  Day and Night, 
With and Without Fog / Clouds, 
Varying Levels of Turbulence 
(Light, Medium, Heavy) 
3.  Abnormal Attitudes,  
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular 
Rates,  Stall 
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Crew Error  –> Vehicle Problem –> Upset 
49 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Failure to Correctly 
Configure Aircraft 
Resulting in 
Impaired Vehicle 
Response and 
Abnormal Flight 
Trajectory 
Approach 
(with and 
without Go-
Around) / 
Takeoff 
2.  Vehicle Cannot 
Generate Enough Lift 
1.  Failure by Crew to Extend 
a. Flaps 
b. Slats 
c. Flaps & Slats  
  
3.  Abnormal Trajectory 
Resulting from Inability to 
Achieve Proper Lift 
50 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Inadvertent 
Deployment / 
Disengagement of 
Auto-flight System 
Resulting in 
Impaired Vehicle 
Response and Stall 
Approach / 
Takeoff 
2.  For  
a. Vehicle Cannot 
Generate Enough 
Airspeed 
b. Aircraft Cannot 
Maintain Trim 
Condition 
1.  Inadvertent Deployment / 
Disengagement of                       
a. Thrust Reverser (Single 
Engine)      
b. Takeoff-Go Around Mode 
  3.  Abnormal Attitude (Pitch, Roll),  Airspeed Decrease,  Stall 
51 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Failure to Trim 
Control Surface 
Resulting in 
Impaired Vehicle 
Response and  
Asymmetric Forces / 
Abnormal Attitudes 
Approach / 
Takeoff 
2.  Control Surface Cannot 
Generate Proper Forces / 
Moments to Maintain 
Desired Flight Path 
1.  Failure by Crew to Properly 
Trim 
a. Rudder 
b. Elevator 
c. Ailerons       
  
3.  Abnormal Attitude (Yaw, 
Pitch, Roll),  Abnormal Forces / 
Moments,  Abnormal Trajectory  
52 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Inadvertent 
Deployment of 
Control Surface 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Damage and Vehicle 
Upset 
Cruise 
2.  Various Levels of 
Structural Damage with 
and without Loss of Control 
Effector 
1.  Inadvertent Symmetric / 
Asymmetric Deployment of: 
a. Flaps 
b. Slats 
c. Flaps & Slats  
  
3.  Abnormal / Asymmetric 
Forces / Moments, Uncontrolled 
Descent 
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Inappropriate Crew Response –> Upset –> Vehicle Impairment / Damage 
53 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Poor Visibility 
Resulting in Crew 
Spatial 
Disorientation 
Leading to Vehicle 
Upset and Resulting 
in Damage 
Cruise 
3.  Various Levels of 
Structural Damage with 
and without Loss of Control 
Effector 
1.  Crew Spatial Disorientation 
Resulting in 
a. Nonresponsive, Followed 
by  
b. Exacerbating Control 
Inputs 
1. Night with Poor Visibility 2.  Spiral Dive 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
Three Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Vehicle Impairment  –> Vehicle Upset –> Inappropriate Crew Response 
54 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Icing with Vehicle 
Impairment Followed 
by Vehicle Stall and 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
Approach, 
Takeoff, 
Cruise 
1.  Various Degrees of 
Vehicle Dynamics Changes 
under Airframe Ice 
Accretion (from Mild to 
Destabilizing),  Varying 
Degrees of Engine Icing 
Effects from None to Thrust 
Roll-back 
3.  Crew Responds 
Inappropriately:   
a. Delayed Reaction 
b. Incorrect Recovery 
1.  Simulator:  Icing Conditions 
with and without Snow 
2.  Stall, Various Levels of De-
Stabilizing Effects from None to 
Unstable in 
a. One 
b. Two 
c. Three Axes  
Four Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Vehicle Failure –> Inappropriate Crew Response –> Upset –> Vehicle Damage 
55 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Engine Failure 
Followed by Crew 
Distraction Leading 
to Upset and Vehicle 
Damage 
Cruise 
1.  Single Engine Failure        
(100% Thrust Loss);             
4.  Various Levels of 
Structural Damage with 
and without Loss of Control 
Effector 
2.  Crew Distraction Resulting 
in Delayed Response 
Followed by Excessive 
Response 
  
3.  Decreased Airspeed, 
Asymmetric Forces / Moments,  
Stall / Departure 
Four Precursor LOC Scenarios:  Vehicle Failure / Malfunction –> External Hazard –> Inappropriate Crew Response –> Upset  
56 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
System Failure / 
Malfunction 
Followed by Severe 
Winds / Turbulence 
Followed by  
Inappropriate Crew 
Response and 
Vehicle Upset  
Cruise 1.  Failure of Inertial Reference System 
3.  Crew Distracted with 
Failure Provides: 
a. No Response 
b. Delayed Response 
c. Delayed Plus 
Exacerbating Response 
2.  Severe Sustained Winds 
(Crosswinds, or Other) or 
Turbulence 
4.  Abnormal Attitudes 
57 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Vehicle Impairment 
(Incorrect 
Configuration) 
Followed by Wind 
Gusts Followed by 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response (PIO) and 
Vehicle Upset  
Takeoff, 
Approach 
(Including 
Go-Around) 
1.  Incorrect Flap Settings 
(None, Intermediate 
Settings) 
3.  Pilot Induced Oscillations 
(PIO) in Response to Wind 
Gusts 
2.  Various Gust / Turbulence 
Levels (Low, Moderate, Severe) 
and Incidence (Lateral, 
Longitudinal, Vertical)   
4.  Abnormal Attitudes and 
Angular Rates Commensurate 
with Wind Gusts 
Four Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Vehicle Failure / Malfunction –> Inappropriate Crew Response –> Upset 
58 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Turbulence Followed 
by Advanced 
System Failure / 
Malfunction 
Followed by 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response and 
Vehicle Upset  
Cruise 
2.  Advanced Flight Control 
System Malfunction 
Resulting in Mode Change 
(e.g., Envelope Protection 
Mode Engaged) 
3.  Pilot Unaware of Mode 
Change in Flight Control 
System Resulting in  
a. No Response 
b. Delayed Response 
c. Exacerbating Response 
1.  Severe Turbulence 4.  Abnormal Attitudes, Airspeed Excursions 
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    Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 
External Hazards & 
Disturbances Vehicle Upset Conditions 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Recommended 
Evaluation 
Methods 
Scenario Description Flight Condition 
Vehicle Impairment; 
System Faults, Failures, 
& Errors; Vehicle 
Damage 
PIO, SD, Poor Energy 
Management, Mode 
Confusion, Ineffective 
Recovery, Crew Fatigue, 
Impairment, Failure to Take 
Appropriate Action, 
Inappropriate Piloting 
Technique 
Poor Visibility, Inclement 
Weather, Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Abrupt Maneuver 
(for Aircraft or Obstacle 
Avoidance) 
Abnormal Attitude, Abnormal 
Airspeed / Angular Rates, 
Asymmetric Force, Abnormal 
Flight Trajectory, Uncontrolled 
Descent / Spiral Dive, Stall / 
Departure 
Four Precursor LOC Scenarios:  External Hazard –> Upset –> Inappropriate Crew Response –> Vehicle Impairment / Damage 
59 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Turbulence 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Upset Followed by 
Excessive Crew 
Response Leading 
to Vehicle Damage 
Cruise 
4.  Control Surface Loss 
(Elevator, Rudder, 
Ailerons) Consistent with 
Turbulence & Crew 
Response 
3.  Excessive Control Inputs 
by Crew 
1.  Various Turbulence Levels 
(Low, Moderate, Severe) and 
Incidence (Lateral, Longitudinal, 
Vertical)   
2.  High-altitude High-speed 
Upsets Commensurate with 
Turbulence Applied 
60 
Analysis, Batch 
Simulation, 
Piloted 
Simulation 
Wake Vortex 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Upset Followed by 
Excessive Crew 
Response Leading 
to Vehicle Damage 
Takeoff / 
Landing 
4.  Control Surface Loss 
(Elevator, Rudder, 
Ailerons) with and without 
Various Levels of Vertical / 
Horizontal Stabilizer Loss 
(25%, 50%, 75%, 100%) 
3.  Excessive Control Inputs 
by Crew 
1.  Various Wake Levels and 
Impingement Angles  
2.  Abnormal Angular Rates 
Commensurate with Wake 
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Appendix B.  LOC Scenario Set Coverage 
 
Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Generalized 
Sequence 
LOC Coverage Based on Historical Data & Future Potential Risk Sets 
Accidents from 
Data Set Covered 
by Scenario 
Number of 
Accidents 
from Data 
Set Covered 
by Scenario
Future Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
Number of 
Future Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
% Coverage in LOC 
Data Set  % Cumulative Coverage 
Accidents  Future Risks  Accidents 
Additional 
Future Risks 
Covered 
Future Risks 
1  D  56  1  3  1  0.79%  10%  0.79%  1  10% 
2  D  62, 63  2  3  1  1.59%  10%  2.38%  0  10% 
3  D  1, 15, 18, 41, 79  5  3  1  3.97%  10%  6.35%  0  10% 
4  D, E  17, 20, 8, 113  4  3  1  3.17%  10%  9.52%  0  10% 
5  D  13  1  3  1  0.79%  10%  10.32%  0  10% 
6  D  7  1  3  1  0.79%  10%  11.11%  0  10% 
7  D  3  1  10  1  0.79%  10%  11.90%  1  20% 
8  D  2  1  3, 10  2  0.79%  20%  12.70%  0  20% 
9  D  2, 110  2  3, 10  2  1.59%  20%  14.29%  0  20% 
10  D  N/A  0  7  1  0.00%  10%  14.29%  1  30% 
11  D  16  1  8  1  0.79%  10%  15.08%  1  40% 
12  D  N/A  0  4  1  0.00%  10%  15.08%  1  50% 
13  C  87  1  5  1  0.79%  10%  15.87%  1  60% 
14  C  89  1  5  1  0.79%  10%  16.67%  0  60% 
15  C  108  1  5, 6  2  0.79%  20%  17.46%  1  70% 
16  C  115  1  5  1  0.79%  10%  18.25%  0  70% 
17  C  116  1  6  1  0.79%  10%  19.05%  0  70% 
18  A  11, 65, 100  3  3  1  2.38%  10%  21.43%  0  70% 
19  A  14  1  3  1  0.79%  10%  22.22%  0  70% 
20  A  19, 37, 51  3  3  1  2.38%  10%  24.60%  0  70% 
21  A  31, 33, 49, 61  4  3  1  3.17%  10%  27.78%  0  70% 
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Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Generalized 
Sequence 
LOC Coverage Based on Historical Data & Future Potential Risk Sets 
Accidents from 
Data Set Covered 
by Scenario 
Number of 
Accidents 
from Data 
Set Covered 
by Scenario
Future Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
Number of 
Future 
Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
% Coverage in LOC 
Data Set  % Cumulative Coverage 
Accidents  Future Risks  Accidents 
Additional 
Future Risks 
Covered 
Future Risks 
22  A  42, 43, 76, 83, 104, 126  6  3  1  4.76%  10%  32.54%  0  70% 
23  A  106  1  3  1  0.79%  10%  33.33%  0  70% 
24  A  120  1  3  1  0.79%  10%  34.13%  0  70% 
25  E, A 
28, 32, 35, 36, 38, 
50, 55, 66, 68, 69, 
73, 84, 91, 97, 98, 
101, 111, 123 
18  7  1  14.29%  10%  48.41%  0  70% 
26  E  57, 92  2  4  1  1.59%  10%  50.00%  0  70% 
27  E  23, 122  2  8  1  1.59%  10%  51.59%  0  70% 
28  E  24  1  9, 10  2  0.79%  20%  52.38%  1  80% 
29  N/A  4  1  3, 4, 8  3  0.79%  30%  53.17%  0  80% 
30  N/A  N/A  0  3, 4, 8  3  0.00%  30%  53.17%  0  80% 
31  N/A  N/A  0  3, 4, 8  3  0.00%  30%  53.17%  0  80% 
32  N/A  N/A  0  3, 4, 8, 10  4  0.00%  40%  53.17%  0  80% 
33  B  5, 47, 77  3  1, 3, 5, 6  4  2.38%  40%  55.56%  1  90% 
34  B  81, 82, 117  3  1, 3, 5, 6  4  2.38%  40%  57.94%  0  90% 
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Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Generalized 
Sequence 
LOC Coverage Based on Historical Data & Future Potential Risk Sets 
Accidents from 
Data Set Covered 
by Scenario 
Number of 
Accidents 
from Data 
Set Covered 
by Scenario
Future Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
Number of 
Future 
Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
% Coverage in LOC 
Data Set  % Cumulative Coverage 
Accidents  Future Risks  Accidents 
Additional 
Future Risks 
Covered 
Future Risks 
35  B  N/A  0  1, 3, 5, 6  4  0.00%  40%  57.94%  0  90% 
36  B  N/A  0  1, 3, 5, 6, 10 5  0.00%  50%  57.94%  0  90% 
37  B  34  1  3, 5, 6, 7  4  0.79%  40%  58.73%  0  90% 
38  C  52  1  3, 5, 6, 7  4  0.79%  40%  59.52%  0  90% 
39  B  45, 46, 94  3  3, 5, 6, 7  4  2.38%  40%  61.90%  0  90% 
40  B, C, A  12, 39, 53, 59, 60, 64, 86, 93, 102  9  1, 5, 6  3  7.14%  30%  69.05%  0  90% 
41  B  21  1  1, 5, 6  3  0.79%  30%  69.84%  0  90% 
42  B  27, 86  2  1, 5, 6, 8  4  1.59%  40%  71.43%  0  90% 
43  A  85  1  1, 5, 6, 8  4  0.79%  40%  72.22%  0  90% 
44  A  67  1  3, 7  2  0.79%  20%  73.02%  0  90% 
45  A  126  1  3, 7  2  0.79%  20%  73.81%  0  90% 
46  E  32  1  3, 7  2  0.79%  20%  74.60%  0  90% 
47  A  70, 107  2  3, 8  2  1.59%  20%  76.19%  0  90% 
48  A  95  1  3, 8  2  0.79%  20%  76.98%  0  90% 
49  C  30, 114  2  5  1  1.59%  10%  78.57%  0  90% 
50  C, E  75, 88, 105, 26  4  1, 5  2  3.17%  20%  81.75%  0  90% 
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Scenario 
Set 
Number 
Generalized 
Sequence 
LOC Coverage Based on Historical Data & Future Potential Risk Sets 
Accidents from 
Data Set Covered 
by Scenario 
Number of 
Accidents 
from Data 
Set Covered 
by Scenario
Future Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
Number of 
Future 
Risks 
Covered by 
Scenario 
% Coverage in LOC 
Data Set  % Cumulative Coverage 
Accidents  Future Risks  Accidents 
Additional 
Future Risks 
Covered 
Future Risks 
51  C  109  1  5, 6  2  0.79%  20%  82.54%  0  90% 
52  C, F  96, 71  2  1, 5, 10  3  1.59%  30%  84.13%  0  90% 
53  F  103  1  1, 5, 10  3  0.79%  30%  84.92%  0  90% 
54  G, B  6, 48  2  1, 5, 6, 7  4  1.59%  40%  86.51%  0  90% 
55  F  119  1  1, 3, 5, 10  4  0.79%  40%  87.30%  0  90% 
56  B  22  1  1, 3, 5, 8  4  0.79%  40%  88.10%  0  90% 
57  F  80  1  1, 5, 6, 8  4  0.79%  40%  88.89%  0  90% 
58  F  58  1  1, 3, 8  3  0.79%  30%  89.68%  0  90% 
59  F  99  1  1, 6, 8, 10  4  0.79%  40%  90.48%  0  90% 
60  F  54  1  1, 4, 6, 10  4  0.79%  40%  91.27%  0  90% 
                 
TOTAL        115  9  91.27%     90% 
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